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the need to elevate victims' rights in
our state. Why does it matter that a
wealthy man from California is fund
ing a lobbyist and PR
efforts to pass the
amendment? Or that
he's doing so in multi
ple states so others
don't experience the
traumatic aftermath
of a family murder as
he did? Why aren't the voices of vic
tims being reported when they
clearly describe how their cases
would have provided more justice
and healing if their rights had been
respected and enforced?
The victim advocacy community,
law enforcement and prosecutors
have known for decades that
stronger enforcement of victims'
rights is needed. The Marsy's Law
efforts have made work toward that
possible.
Unfortunately, a joint House com
mittee vqted the bill down, as if they
had never heard the victims' stories,
and without considering the amend
ments to the bill that Attorney Gen
eral Gordon MacDonald had pre-
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An Indians fan shows a Chief Wahoo sign during the AL Division Serles at Jacobs Field In Cleveland on Oct. 4, 1997.

Erie waterfront, and the Siioreway,
the main throughway from east to'
west through the city.
That lighted sign loomed over my
life as well, and Chief Wahoo himself
was a constant symbol in Cleveland
from 1947 until the stadium was deSEE WAHOO D3
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ast week, for the second time
since becoming president, Presi
dent Donald Trump ordered a
military strike on Syria without seek
ing or obtaining authorization from
Congress. Both strikes were respon
sive to chemical-weapons attacks
that, American intelligence analysts
say, the Syrian government launched
against its own people.
Many believe that these forceful
responses to horrific war crimes in
volving banned weapons were

morally justified. But were they con
stitutional?
The text of the Constitution ap
pears to contemplate congressional
and presidential roles in any decision
to commit American troops to battle at least in'circumstances where the
use of force is not clearly a matter of
self-defense.
Article One confers on Congress
the power "to "declare War." It also
gives Congress the powers to "raise
and support Armies"; to "provide and
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maintain a Navy"; and to summon
"the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections
and repel Invasions."
Article 'lwo, in contrast, vests the
president with the "executive Power,"
which some read to encompass broad
war-making authority. Article 'lwo
also states that the president "shall
be the Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States,
SEE CONSTITUTION D4
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Many believe that the War Powers Resolution of 1973 is unconstitutional
CONSTITUTION FROM D1
and of the Militia of the sev
eral States, when called into
the actual Service of the
United States."
Notwithstanding the Con
stitution's text, presidents.
have ordered the use of force
without congressional ap
proval - and in circumstances
other than clear self-defense throughout our history. And
the practice has become more
common in recent years.
President Barack Obama
did so in Libya; President Bill
. Clinton did so in Kosovo; and
President Ronald Reagan did
so in Grenada, to take but a
few of a number of possible
examples. Thus, presidential
unilateralism in war-making
is not a practice adopted only
by presidents of a single polit
ical party. Nor are President
Trump's strikes on Syria
abrupt departures from re
cent norms.
In considering the consti
tutionality of a practice, we
tend to look first at what the
courts have said. But in this
context, judicial precedents
are unilluminating. That's be
cause the courts have largely
rebuffed efforts to obtain Judi
cial determinations of when
the Constitution permits the
president to order U.S. troops
into action without congres
sional approval, and when it
does not.
In disclaiming a judicial
role in overseeing the use of
military force, courts have in
voked justiciability principles
such as the standing and "po
litical question" doctrines. In
matters of war-making, courts
have said, they lack both the
institutional competence and
constitutional authority to use
their power of judicial review.
But the fact that judicial
relief is unavailable does not
necessarily render the consti
tutional question academic.
For if Congress were inclined
to assert its constitutional

prerogatives with respect to
war-making, there are a host
of tangible measures that it
could take to enforce its
views.
Congress could, for exam
ple, formally express disapproval of any unilateral presi
dential action through a joint resolution of the Senate and
the House of Representatives.
Or more concretely, it could
withhold. or even cut off mili-
tary funding. And in an ex
treme situation, it could initi
ate impeachment proceedings
against a defiant president.
So what does Congress
think about the president us
ing force without authoriza
tion and in circumstances
other than clear self-defense?
In recent years, Congress has
remained largely supine in
the aftermath of military
strikes of this sort. Some ar
gue that this congressional in
action should be understood
as acquiescence, if not out
right approval.
But in 1973, shortly after
the United States withdrew
from Vietnam, Congress
passed a War Powers Resolu
tion specifying that the presi
dent may only commit troops
to military action abroad pur
suant to a declaration of war;
statutory authorization; or a
national emergency occa
sioned by an attack on the
United States, its territories
or possessions, or its armed
forces.
The War Powers Resolu
tion also requires the presi
dent to notify Congress within
48 hours of taking military ac
tion without congressional au
thorization, and to impose a
60-day time limit (with 30 ad
ditional days for withdrawal)
on any such commitment to
troops without aQ intervening
declaration of war or statu
tory authorization.
Congress has not formally
declared war since World War
II. It has, however, enacted a
number of statutory autho-

ment's Office of Legal Coun
sel under President George
W. Bush. But like the classical
position, it has not reflected
actual recent practice. (Note
that, notwithstanding this
opinion, President Bush se
cured an AUMF from
Congress before invading
Iraq.)
The third, middle-ground
perspective reflects recent
U.S. practice. Lederman de
scribes it as follows:
"The president can act uni
laterally if two conditions are
met: 1) the use of force must
serve significant national in
terests that have historically
supported such unilateral ac
tions - of which self-defense
and protection of U.S. nation
.. als have been the most com
monly invoked; and 2) the op
eration cannot be anticipated
to be suijiciently extensive in
nature, scope, and duration to
constitute a 'war' requiring
prior specific co�gresl?ional
approval under the Declara
tion of War Clause, a standard
that generally will be satisfied
AP only by prolonged and su�
President Donald Trump speaks In the _Dlplomatlc R�ptlon Room of the White House on
stantial military engage
Aprll 13 In Washington about the United States' mllltary response to Syria's chemical
ments, typically involving exweapon attack on April 7.
posure of U.S. military per
sonnel to significant risk over
rizations to use military force, the resolution itself is uncon gories.
a substantial period."
AUMFs, for certain specified
stitutional. Those who hold
The first, wh t Lederman
The debate over the consti
purposes. Congress's most
this view believe that the Con calls the "classi al" view, says tutionality of uses of military
recent AUMFs - passed by
that the president may act
stitution should be read to
force without congressional
joint resolutions in 2001 and
without congressional ap
approval will remain theoreti
give the president more ex
2002 - authorize the use of
pansive unilateral wru:-mak
proval only in th'.ose rare situ cal unless and until Congress
force against those responsi
ing authority than the resolu ations where doing so is nec takes steps to assert its per
ble for the Sept. 11, 2001, ter
tion contemplates. And so, as essary to interdict an attack
ceived constitutional preroga
tives irt circumstances where
rorist attacks and against
is so often the case, round
on the United States or its
Iraq, respectively. Neither
troops. This view has not car it believes that the president
and round we go on the con
has gone too far. But congresstitutional question.
would seem to apply to the
ried the day with respect to
sional action of this sort does
strikes on the Syrian govern
actual practice in recent
In the end, we probably
can say little more than that
ment.
not appear to be forthcoming
decades.
there is a range of perspec
In any event, the fact that
The second, reflecting the anytime soon.
last week's military strike ap tives on when, under the Con other extreme, holds that the
pears to be at odds with the
stitution, the president can
president :,;nay commit-troops,
(John G-reabe teaches con
War Powers Resolution does
commit troops to battle with
to battle whenever he be
stitutional klw and reklted
not answer the constitutional out congressional authoriza
lieves it to be in "the national subjects at the University of
question - even if we take that tion. Constitutional scholar
security interests of the
New Hampshire School of
Resolution to continue to re
Marty Lederman, writing for
United States." This position Law. He also serves on the
flect Congress's understand
the Just Security blog, divides was articulated in a 2003 opin board of trustees of the New
ing of the Constitution. That's commonly held views on this
ion on the war in Iraq au
Hampshire Institute for
because many believe that
thored by the Justice Depart- Civics Education.)
question into three cate-

